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Back in October 2022, as Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he was the fifth UK leader to occupy the role in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its sixth prime minister in two years – three of them in the last ten months?

The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his government’s survival.

But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is locked in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for decades – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.

Minority Rule

Key background: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly separated into three opposing factions – left, far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

At the same time, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the leader named his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from allies and opponents alike.

To such an extent that the next day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a dignified speech, he blamed political intransigence, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for another 48 hours in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a task, to put it mildly, not without complications.

Next, two ex-prime ministers openly criticized the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject any and every new government unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s key policy would be suspended until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look grim.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would lose seats, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his replacement would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and actively discourages – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”